

NNV3: Expanding Neural Network Verification to New Architectures and Domains^{*}

Anne M. Tumlin¹, Samuel Sasaki¹, Ben Wooding¹, Diego Manzananas Lopez¹,
Muhammad Usama Zubair², Navid Hashemi¹, Hongchao Zhang¹, Waseem
Abbas², Ipek Oguz¹, Meiyi Ma¹, and Taylor T. Johnson¹

¹ Vanderbilt University, USA

² The University of Texas at Dallas, USA

Abstract. We present NNV3, the latest version of the Neural Network Verification (NNV) tool, a MATLAB framework for formal verification of deep learning models and learning-enabled cyber-physical systems. Building on the set-based reachability foundation of NNV 1.0 (FFNNs, CNNs, NNCS) and NNV 2.0 (RNNs, SSNNs, neural ODEs), NNV3 introduces new members of the Star-set family: ModelStar for verifying networks under weight perturbation, VolumeStar for video and 3D volumetric inputs, and GraphStar for graph neural networks. A conformal-inference-based probabilistic reachability mode complements sound analysis for problems where exact verification is intractable, while FairNNV certifies counterfactual and individual fairness properties over continuous input regions. NNV3 introduces new benchmarks for malware detection, graph-based power-system models, medical imaging, variable-length time series data, and action recognition. NNV3 also incorporates tutorials and developer guides through a unified documentation site. This paper details these major updates, demonstrating NNV’s maturation into a comprehensive, robust, and accessible verification tool for a diverse range of AI systems.

1 Introduction

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have become integral to solving complex problems across various domains, from image classification to autonomous control. However, their deployment in safety-critical applications is hindered by their opaque nature and susceptibility to adversarial perturbations. Formal verification provides a means to analyze and rigorously guarantee the behavior of these models, which is essential for establishing trust in AI-powered systems.

The Neural Network Verification (NNV)¹ tool [72] was introduced as a comprehensive, open-source MATLAB toolbox to tackle this challenge. NNV is built around a powerful computation engine that performs set-based reachability analysis, computing the set of all possible outputs for a given set of inputs. The initial

^{*} A.Tumlin and S.Sasaki are co-first authors.

¹ <https://github.com/verivital/nnv/>

release of NNV focused on providing exact and over-approximate reachability for feed-forward neural networks (FFNNs), convolutional neural networks (CNNs), and neural network control systems (NNCS) using a variety of set representations like polyhedra, zonotopes, and the novel star set.

Building on this foundation, NNV 2.0 [47] expanded the tool’s scope to handle a wider array of complex and dynamic network architectures. It introduced verification support for neural ordinary differential equations (neural ODEs), recurrent neural networks (RNNs), and semantic segmentation neural networks (SSNNs). This version also improved scalability with new relaxed reachability methods [71] and enhanced usability by supporting standard community formats like ONNX [50] and VNNLIB [54].

This paper presents NNV3, an evolution of the NNV tool that addresses emerging challenges in AI verification and broadens the tool’s applicability to new domains and data types. While previous versions focused on expanding architectural support, NNV3 introduces verification techniques for new classes of properties and extends reachability analysis to previously intractable data modalities. The contributions span three categories. **Algorithmic and model improvements** introduce reachability-based verification for parameter perturbations (ModelStar [90, 91]), spatio-temporal data (VolumeStar [55]), graph-structured models (GNNV with GraphStar [75]), probabilistic guarantees via conformal inference [27], fairness properties (FairNNV [74]), and variable-length time-dependent networks [51]. **New application domains** unlocked by these algorithms include video classification [55], medical-image segmentation [26], power-system analysis [75], malware detection [53], ethical decision-making [74], and deployment-uncertainty robustness [90, 91]. **System upgrades** include a unified documentation site² that consolidates the user guide, developer guide, API reference, *etc.*; per-feature details and the supporting infrastructure changes are presented in Section 3. These advancements solidify NNV’s position as one of the most comprehensive and versatile verification frameworks available to the research community.

2 NNV3 vs. NNV 2.0

The core architecture of NNV, illustrated in Fig. 1, is composed of two primary modules: the **Computation Engine** and the **Analyzer**. The **Computation Engine** parses neural network and system models (ONNX and MATLAB formats) and performs layer-by-layer reachability analysis using set-based abstractions, including Star sets [70], ImageStar [65], and newly introduced representations such as VolumeStar (*a.k.a* VideoStar) [55], ModelStar [90, 91], and GraphStar [75]. In NNV3, the computation engine supports both sound reachability and a probabilistic reachability mode [27], the latter enabling scalable verification via sampling-based uncertainty quantification. The **Analyzer** consumes the resulting reachable sets or evaluation traces to verify system-level properties, including robustness, safety specifications expressed in VNNLIB, and

² <https://verivital.github.io/nnv/>




Fig. 1: Updated NNV verification pipeline, composed of a computation engine and analyzer, and extended to support both sound and probabilistic reachability analysis.

fairness constraints, and supports visualization, verification, and counterexample generation. Together, these extensions broaden the scope of verifiable models while preserving the modular structure of the NNV framework.

Practitioners working with heterogeneous, real-world AI systems require a unified and extensible verification framework. This drives the continued evolution of NNV. Table 1 illustrates that NNV and its prior iterations support a broad spectrum of architectures and applications, including feedforward and convolutional networks (FFNNs and CNNs), recurrent models (RNNs), semantic segmentation (SSNNs), neural ODEs, and neural network control systems (NNCSs). With the release of NNV3, we expand the tool to emerging and increasingly important model classes, including graph neural networks (GNNs) and video classification architectures (VolumeStar). NNV3 addresses a broader class of deployment-relevant properties, including algorithmic fairness, parameter and weight perturbations, and probabilistic guarantees. These capabilities enable verification beyond conventional robustness analysis and reflect practical concerns encountered in real-world deployment.

NNV has been evaluated consistently in community benchmarks such as VNN-COMP [39] and ARCH-COMP [46, 56], and has served as the foundation for tutorials at DESTION [67], EMSOFT [69], DSN [36], SPIE, IAVVC, AAAI, *etc.*, underscoring its maturity and continued relevance to the verification community (see the user guide³ and the tutorials index⁴ for further details).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 summarizes major new features and capabilities. Section 4 introduces the extended domain applications. We then validate new features in Section 5 and refresh the comparison with the MathWorks AI Verification Library. Finally, we discuss related works in Section 6, and conclude the paper in Section 7.

³ <https://verivital.github.io/nnv/user-guide/index.html>

⁴ <https://verivital.github.io/nnv/examples/index.html>

Table 1: Overview of major features available in NNV. Items in regular weight are NNV 1.0 baseline; *blue italics* denote additions introduced in NNV 2.0; **purple bold** denote new capabilities introduced in NNV3.

Feature	Supported (NNV 1.0, <i>NNV 2.0</i> , NNV3)
Neural Network Type	FFNN, CNN, <i>NeuralODE</i> , <i>SSNN</i> , <i>RNN</i> , GNN , TDNN , 3D CNN
Layers	MaxPool, Conv, BN, AvgPool, FC, <i>MaxUnpool</i> , <i>TC</i> , <i>DC</i> , <i>NODE</i> , GCN , GINE , Conv3D
Activation functions	ReLU, Satlin, Sigmoid, Tanh, <i>Leaky ReLU</i> , <i>Satlins</i>
Plant dynamics (NNCS)	Linear ODE, Nonlinear ODE, Continuous & Discrete Time, <i>HA</i>
Set Representation	Polyhedron, Zonotope, Star, ImageStar, VolumeStar , ModelStar , GraphStar
Star Reach methods	exact, approx, abs-dom, <i>relax</i> -*
Reachable set visualization	exact and over-approximation
Verification	Safety, Robustness, <i>VNNLIB</i> , Fairness , Weight Perturbation , Probabilistic
Miscellaneous	Parallel computing, counterexample generation, <i>ONNX</i> , CI/CD

3 Overview and Features

This section summarizes the major features introduced in NNV3 and in Table 1. These additions extend the reachability-based verification capabilities of prior versions of NNV to new model classes, data modalities, and verification objectives, while preserving soundness guarantees and compatibility with existing analysis pipelines. Section 3.1 presents the per-feature highlights; Section 3.2 describes the underlying engine and extensibility upgrades.

3.1 Feature Highlights

ModelStar [90, 91]: Neural networks deployed in practice are subject to parameter uncertainty arising from quantization, numerical imprecision, and hardware faults [24, 61, 88]. To address this, NNV3 introduces ModelStar, a star-set-based representation for interval-bounded weight perturbations. ModelStar enables reachability analysis under simultaneous input and parameter uncertainty. For networks with a single perturbed layer and singleton inputs, the reachable set of the perturbed layer is computed exactly; for multi-layer perturbations, sound over-approximations are constructed using Star sets. ModelStar is currently implemented for fully-connected and 2D convolutional layers and can be readily implemented for verification against weight perturbations in any linear layer. Rounding errors introduced by quantized compression can be modeled as interval-bounded specifications for ModelStar—as demonstrated in our experiments in Section 5—but fixed-point inference arithmetic (discrete operations) is not yet modeled.⁵

VolumeStar (VideoStar) [55]: NNV can formally verify the robustness of video classifiers. Verification of neural networks operating on spatio-temporal data, such as videos and volumetric medical images, presents significant scalability challenges due to input dimensionality. NNV3 extends the Star and ImageStar representations [65, 70] to VolumeStar, a set abstraction for spatio-temporal inputs, *e.g.*, an image at each time step. VolumeStar supports reachability analysis of architectures with 3D convolutional and pooling layers, including video

⁵ <https://verivital.github.io/nnv/theory/weight-perturbation.html>

classification networks (such as C3D [64] and I3D [12]), as well as 3D medical imaging models [89]. Using VolumeStar reachability, NNV can formally certify classification robustness for all admissible spatio-temporal perturbations within a specified input set. In addition, NNV3 extends star-based reachability analysis to time-dependent neural networks (TDNNs) by allowing the analysis horizon to vary over a bounded temporal range, generalizing prior support for fixed-length recurrent models.⁶

GraphStar [75]: Graph neural networks (GNNs) are increasingly used as surrogates for numerical solvers in domains such as molecular modeling, traffic forecasting, and power-system analysis [85]. NNV3 introduces GNNV, extending reachability-based verification to graph-structured learning models. GNNV implements GraphStar, a generalization of Star sets that captures both graph connectivity and uncertainty in node and edge features. This abstraction enables exact propagation of affine message-passing operations and sound overapproximation of ReLU nonlinearities in common GNN architectures, including graph convolutional networks (GCNs) [40] and graph isomorphism networks with edge features (GINE) [32]. GraphStar reachability is demonstrated on power-system case studies, including power flow, optimal power flow, and cascading failure analysis [77].⁷

Probabilistic Verification [27]: Exact reachability analysis can become intractable for large networks due to exponential complexity in the number of unstable nonlinear activations. To address this limitation, NNV3 integrates a probabilistic, model-agnostic verification approach based on conformal inference. Given an input set, a neural network, and a specification, verification is performed via sampling rather than exhaustive propagation. This approach scales with inference cost and is independent of network architecture, providing probabilistic coverage guarantees for models that are beyond the practical reach of exact methods.⁸

Fairness Verification [74]: As machine learning systems are deployed in high-stakes decision-making settings, verification of fairness properties has become increasingly important [48]. NNV3 integrates FairNNV, a reachability-based framework for formally validating fairness specifications over continuous input regions. FairNNV verifies specifications corresponding to counterfactual fairness [42], which requires predictions to remain invariant under changes to sensitive attributes, and individual fairness, which enforces similar outcomes for inputs within a bounded neighborhood. Fairness is quantified using the Verified Fairness (VF) score, defined as the proportion of inputs for which fairness properties are formally certified.⁹

⁶ <https://verivital.github.io/nnv/theory/imagestar-volume-star.html>

⁷ <https://verivital.github.io/nnv/theory/gnn-reachability.html>

⁸ <https://verivital.github.io/nnv/theory/probabilistic.html>

⁹ <https://verivital.github.io/nnv/theory/fairness.html>

3.2 Core Upgrades & Extensibility

Star-set family unification. VolumeStar, GraphStar, and ModelStar are not disjoint abstractions but instances of a common Star-set template, parameterized by an anchor, a generator basis, and a polyhedral constraint on the generator coefficients. Variants differ in the rank and indexing of the underlying tensor (vector for Star, 3D for ImageStar, 4D for VolumeStar) or in auxiliary structure (graph adjacency for GraphStar, perturbed-parameter dimensions for ModelStar). Extending NNV to a new modality therefore reduces to selecting these parameters and implementing layer-specific dispatch over the shared propagation kernel.

Engine-level changes. Several core-engine upgrades support the new abstractions: a GNN wrapper that maps message-passing layers onto Star-set affine operations and routes adjacency through GraphStar; a 4D-tensor extension of the ImageStar reach kernels that lets VolumeStar inherit existing 3D-conv and pooling implementations; perturbation tracking in ModelStar that maintains symbolic dependencies between input generators and weight-perturbation generators across linear layers; and a probabilistic reachability mode that composes with sound reachability so that any feature implemented for the sound mode is automatically usable in the probabilistic mode.

Continuous Integration and Deployment (CI/CD). To improve reliability and maintainability, NNV3 adopts a continuous integration and deployment pipeline based on GitHub Actions. The pipeline automatically builds and tests the codebase for each commit and pull request, including unit tests for core reachability methods and regression tests on established benchmarks. This ensures backward compatibility and supports sustained development of NNV as an open-source verification tool.

Extensibility and developer API. NNV3’s engine and analyzer modules are documented as a stable developer-facing API¹⁰ with guidance for adding new layer types, set representations, and verification properties¹¹. The unified documentation site now provides the user guide, developer guide, API reference, theory background, and the tutorials index as a single entry point. Together, these resources lower the barrier for contributors extending NNV to architectures and properties beyond those listed in Table 1.

4 New Domains

NNV3’s new abstractions and probabilistic mode unlock application domains previously out of reach for reachability-based methods, characterized by high-dimensional inputs, structured representations, or deployment-driven threat models that exceed traditional L_p -bounded robustness analysis. Below we highlight four such domains.

Malware Detection [53]: DNN malware classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial evasion, where attackers apply small functionality-preserving modifications to bypass detection. NNV3 introduces a benchmark for verifying robustness of

¹⁰ <https://verivital.github.io/nnv/api/index.html>

¹¹ <https://verivital.github.io/nnv/developer/index.html>

static-feature classifiers under realistic feature-space perturbations (e.g., modifying non-executable sections, appending benign bytes), enabling formal assessment of classifier resilience under a well-defined threat model.

Power-System Analysis [75]: Power flow, optimal power flow, and cascading failure analysis are naturally graph-structured and increasingly use GNN surrogates [77], yet prediction errors carry severe operational consequences. Through GNN verification, NNV3 provides the first general-purpose framework supporting reachability analysis of such topology-aware models with both node- and edge-feature uncertainty.

Medical Imaging Classification [26, 27]: High-dimensional semantic segmentation defeats exact verification. NNV3’s probabilistic pipeline analyzes large segmentation networks on lung X-ray datasets [11, 35] with dense pixel-level outputs, providing coverage guarantees while substantially reducing conservatism relative to exact methods [27].

Financial Predictions [74]: FairNNV extends NNV3 to consequential decision making systems such as credit approval and loan risk assessment [7, 30, 49]. Unlike statistical auditing over finite datasets, reachability-based fairness analysis certifies properties over continuous input regions, formally reasoning about bias under input perturbations and counterfactual scenarios.

5 Evaluation

NNV3’s primary novelty is breadth: most new features target architectures and threat models without a direct competitor, summarized in Table 8. Per-feature comparisons against the closest-related approaches appear in the underlying papers (GNNV vs. CORA [75], conformal pipeline [27]); we summarize the per-feature results below. We also refresh the NNV 2.0 head-to-head [47] against the MathWorks AI Verification Library (AIVL) [63] on FFNN/CNN models where the two tools overlap. All runs were conducted using the online MATLAB 2025b docker container on a machine with Intel 24 Core i9-285K CPU with 64GB RAM, and NVIDIA RTX 5090 GPU with 32GB VRAM.

Verification Under Weight and Parameter Perturbations. We evaluate ModelStar [90, 91] on an MNIST MLP (5 hidden layers: 1024, 512, 256, 256, 256) against Certificated-Robust [81] and Formal-Robust [73] (Fig. 2). Perturbations are L_∞ bounds on each layer’s weight range, with magnitudes 0.05%/0.1%/0.2%/0.4% corresponding to 10-/9-/8-/7-bit quantization rounding error. Prior bounds only support uniform row-wide [81] or matrix-wide [73] perturbations; for a fair comparison, we perturb every weight in the chosen layer simultaneously with one independent scalar variable per weight [91]. On 100 MNIST test images, ModelStar consistently matches or exceeds prior bounds: at 0.2% perturbation on `fc_4`, it verifies 69/100 images versus 13 for Certificated-Robust (a 56% improvement). This certifies network robustness under quantization or hardware-induced weight uncertainty, addressing a deployment threat model beyond the reach of input-only verifiers.

Verification of Graph Neural Networks. We evaluate GraphStar [75] on AC power flow (PF) for the IEEE-24 bus system, verifying 10 graph instances




Fig. 2: Single-layer weight-perturbation verification on the MNIST MLP. (Top) fraction of images verified safe; (bottom) average execution time per image, both vs. the L_∞ -norm perturbation magnitude.




Fig. 3: GNNV verification on IEEE-24 power flow across three architectures (GCN, SAGE, GINE-Conv) vs. node-feature perturbation ϵ (log axis). (Left) percentage of voltage-magnitude nodes verified. (Right) average verification time per graph instance (log scale).

each for GCN, SAGE, and GINE-Conv models under the ML4ACOPF perturbation scheme [39]: L_∞ perturbations on active and reactive power node features for $\epsilon \in \{10^{-5}, 10^{-4}, 10^{-3}, 10^{-2}\}$, with voltage magnitude as the safety constraint. Figure 3 reports the percentage of voltage-magnitude nodes verified across the four perturbation levels: SAGE is the most robust (99% across all ϵ), GCN is least robust and degrades fastest, and GINE-Conv falls in between. This delivers reachability-based verification of GNN surrogates, supporting formal verification of GNN-based estimators.

Verification of Spatio-Temporal and Volumetric Data. We evaluate VolumeStar [55] on the ZoomIn-4f benchmark, a 4-frame MNIST-video classifier, under L_∞ perturbations $\epsilon \in \{1/255, 2/255, 3/255\}$ with a 30-minute timeout per sample. VolumeStar verifies 7/10 (70%) of cases at every ϵ tested (Table 2); the remaining three are unknown due to over-approximation. This delivers the first reachability-based robustness certification for 3D-convolutional video classifiers, a modality where ImageStar-based propagation is intractable.

Table 2: VolumeStar verification on ZoomIn-4f (10 samples per ϵ , 30-min timeout).

ϵ	Ver.	Unk.	Avg. Time (s)
1/255	7	3	35.54
2/255	7	3	37.88
3/255	7	3	36.49

Table 3: Probabilistic verification on TinyYOLO (CP-Star, local Docker build with GPU).

Property	ϵ	Time (s)	Result
Prop 101	1/255	131.86	UNSAT
Prop 277	1/255	111.92	UNSAT
Prop 356	1/255	111.26	UNSAT

Table 4: FairNNV verification on Adult Census: Verified Fairness (VF, %) and per-sample verification time (s). *Counterfactual fairness* (CF) perturbs only the sensitive attribute ($\epsilon=0$); *individual fairness* (IF) additionally perturbs non-sensitive features at radius ϵ .

Model	metric	CF	IF (ϵ)					
		($\epsilon=0$)	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.10
Small	VF (%)	89	87	84	81	69	50	22
	Time (s)	0.78	0.89	1.06	1.40	2.17	3.41	5.53
Medium	VF (%)	87	86	84	82	71	50	27
	Time (s)	0.72	2.64	5.76	10.10	21.75	39.73	98.70

Probabilistic Verification. We evaluate NNV3’s probabilistic verification pipeline [27] on the TinyYOLO object detector from VNN-COMP 2023 [9]. The approach combines randomized falsification with conformal prediction-based reachability analysis to provide statistical guarantees on property satisfaction. A surrogate model is trained to estimate output distributions and construct confidence bounds, achieving 99.9% coverage. We evaluate three randomly selected VNNLIB property specifications from the benchmark’s 71 instances. All three properties are verified as UNSAT (specification holds), with falsification completing in under one second per instance with the use of GPU acceleration in Table 3. This extends NNV to perception-scale models for which exact reachability is intractable, providing statistical coverage guarantees in place of soundness.

Fairness Verification. We evaluate FairNNV [74] on the Adult Census dataset [7] using two FFNN classifiers, Small (16–8) and Medium (50) hidden-layer. Under counterfactual fairness, both reach Verified Fairness (VF) $\in [87, 89]\%$ with average verification time below 0.01 s per sample; under individual fairness, VF degrades as ϵ grows, and the medium model shows both a steeper VF decline and substantially higher verification cost (Table 4). This delivers per-sample fairness certificates over continuous input regions.

Table 5: Tool comparison on fully-connected VNNLIB benchmarks. Per cell: **V** verified, **X** violated, **U** unknown, **T** timeout, **S** mean per-instance time (seconds). Timeout cap: 900s. AIVL uses **est-bnds**; r-50 is NNV3’s **relax-star-range-50**. Bold marks NNV3’s strongest verification count per benchmark.

	ACAS p3 ($N=20$)					ACAS p4 ($N=20$)					RL ($N=50$)				
	V	X	U	T	S	V	X	U	T	S	V	X	U	T	S
AIVL	0	3	17	0	0.06	0	1	19	0	0.07	20	11	19	0	0.04
exact	8	3	0	9	58.23	9	3	0	8	83.99	32	15	1	2	5.36
approx	10	3	7	0	0.69	9	3	8	0	0.90	32	14	4	0	0.14
r-50	1	2	17	0	0.30	1	2	17	0	0.30	32	14	4	0	0.08

Table 6: Tool comparison on convolutional VNNLIB benchmarks. Per cell: **V** verified, **X** violated, **U** unknown, **T** timeout, **S** mean per-instance time (seconds). Timeout cap: 900s. AIVL uses **est-bnds**; NNV3 uses **approx-star**.

	OVAL21 ($N=30$)					Collins RUL ($N=62$)				
	V	X	U	T	S	V	X	U	T	S
AIVL	0	9	21	0	0.28	10	47	5	0	0.65
approx	0	10	14	6	33.47	10	47	5	0	0.29

Table 7: MNIST-ResNet-8 robustness verification at perturbation magnitude ϵ (25 test images per row). Both tools verify all 25 instances per row; the comparison reduces to runtime. AIVL uses **verifyNetworkRobustness** (DeepPoly, residual-network support added in R2024b); NNV3 uses **relax-star-area-50**.

Tool / ϵ	1/255	2/255	4/255	8/255
AIVL Time (s)	10.29	10.32	10.28	10.41
NNV3 Time (s)	6.13	8.80	13.94	34.94

Tool Comparison. We extend the NNV 2.0 head-to-head [47] against the MathWorks AI Verification Library (AIVL) [63] on R2025b, evaluating its interval-based output bounds for VNNLIB output specifications and its DeepPoly implementation for argmax robustness on residual architectures, and incorporate two new VNN-COMP-derived benchmarks (OVAL21 [5], Collins RUL CNN [41]) alongside a natively-trained MNIST-ResNet-8 (Tables 5, 6, 7). On ACAS Xu (Table 5), AIVL’s interval-based bounds are too coarse for the half-space output specifications and yield no verifications; NNV3 validates roughly half the instances under either **exact-star** or **approx-star**, with the latter completing every instance in sub-second time. On RL, NNV3 verifies more instances against AIVL and identifies three additional counterexamples; the **relax-star-range-50**

	NNV3	AIVL [63]	α, β -Crown [79, 86]	CORA [2, 3, 43]	FastBATILNN [19]	JuliaReach [8, 58]	Marabou [38, 82, 83]	NeuralSAT [16, 17]	menum [4]	Reluplex [18, 33]	SobolBox [37]	StarV [14]	Verinet [28]	Verisig [34]
FFNN	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	×
CNN	✓	✓	✓	✓	×	✓*	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	×
RNN	✓	×	✓	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	✓	×	×
SSNN	✓	×	✓*	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	✓	×	×
<i>TDNNs</i>	✓	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×
<i>GNNs</i>	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓*	×	×	×	×	×	×	×
<i>3D Data</i>	✓	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×
<i>WPP</i>	✓	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×
NODEs	✓	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	✓	×	×
NNCS	✓	×	✓*	✓	×	✓	×	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×

Table 8: Comparison of neural network verification tools by supported architectures and applications, with ✓ meaning supported by a tool and × not supported. We use * to indicate partial support. In *purple italics*, the newly supported architecture/applications by NNV3. WPP signifies model perturbations.

variant probes the precision/cost frontier with sub-second runtime at a reduced verification rate. On the CNN benchmarks (Table 6), **approx-star** matches AIVL on Collins RUL and finds one additional counterexample on OVAL21. On MNIST-ResNet-8 (Table 7), both tools verify all 25 instances at every ε . NNV3’s runtime scales with ε while AIVL’s remains essentially constant; at smaller perturbations, NNV3 verifies instances faster than the commercial tool. The architectures and threat models that motivate NNV3’s extensions to the Star-set family (Table 8) lie outside AIVL’s coverage.

6 Related Work

Neural network verification has advanced through SMT-based methods (Reluplex [37], Marabou [38, 83], NeuralSAT [17]), bound propagation (α, β -CROWN [79, 86]), abstract interpretation (AI2 [21], DeepPoly [60]), and geometric approaches (Star sets [68], zonotopes [59]), among many other tools [10]¹². These methods excel at verifying robustness of FFNNs and CNNs but typically focus on L_p -bounded input perturbations. Table 8 summarizes how NNV3’s coverage compares to existing tools across architectures and application domains.

¹² See e.g., <https://vnn-comp.github.io/#participants>

Weight and Parameter Perturbations. Most prior work assumes fixed network weights and verifies robustness only against input perturbations. Weight uncertainty from quantization, compression, or hardware faults has been studied via interval neural network (INN) verification [52], interval bound propagation [81], and verification of quantized networks [29]. ModelStar [90, 91] is complementary: INN intervals can be supplied as ModelStar perturbation specifications and propagated jointly with input uncertainty via star-set reachability.

VolumeStar. Formal verification of video classifiers has previously been investigated only in [84], using a game-theoretic framework over 2D convolutional and LSTM layers, with perturbations restricted to optical flow rather than video content. VolumeStar [55] extends ImageStar [65] from 2D images to 3D spatio-temporal data, supporting reachability through 3D convolutional and pooling layers under L_∞ perturbations of the video content itself.

Graph Neural Network Verification. Early GNN robustness work focused on empirical or probabilistic guarantees without formal soundness [44, 62, 78]. Recent deterministic approaches include encoding message passing as feed-forward networks for Marabou [82], matrix-polynomial-zonotope GCN reachability in CORA [43], and exact methods based on incremental constraint solving [45] or MILP [31]. These target node-classification on a narrow set of architectures; GraphStar [75] generalizes to edge-aware GNNs with joint node/edge uncertainty.

Probabilistic Verification. Probabilistic verification offers a middle ground between exact methods (guarantees but limited scalability) and testing (scalability but no guarantees). Prior approaches include statistical sampling [80], importance sampling for volume estimation [6], randomized smoothing for classification [13] and segmentation [20, 25], and conformal inference for classification [22, 87]. NNV3 integrates conformal inference with set-based reachability, extending coverage guarantees to segmentation [27].

Fairness Verification. Fairness verification has been approached via probabilistic methods [1], abstract interpretation [76], and SMT [23]. These techniques differ in the guarantee they provide: probabilistic methods yield statistical bounds, abstract interpretation produces conservative over-approximations, and SMT-based methods give satisfiability-style certificates. FairNNV [74] provides exact fairness certificates via reachability over continuous input regions.

7 Conclusion

NNV3 advances neural network verification beyond architectural coverage to address new property classes (fairness), data modalities (video, volumetric), and practical deployment concerns (weight perturbations, probabilistic guarantees). While specialized tools may outperform NNV on specific benchmarks, NNV uniquely supports the broadest range of architectures (GNNs, TDNNs, 3D CNNs), data modalities (images, video, time series), and property classes (robustness, fairness, probabilistic guarantees, weight perturbations).

Limitations and future work. NNV3 does not yet handle attention or autoregressive architectures, and ModelStar models continuous weight pertur-

bations only, not fixed-point inference arithmetic. Ongoing work targets (i) a Python frontend to broaden adoption beyond the MATLAB ecosystem [57], (ii) extending the Star-set family to transformers, autoencoders, and temporal graph neural networks, and (iii) discrete fixed-point arithmetic for ModelStar so that quantized inference can be verified end-to-end.

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